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When trade is decentralized, and agents are not completely reliable, there can
be temporary shortages of collateral so that spot transactions– transactions of
goods against collateral–are not always possible. In such a case, payments sys-
tems become relevant, as the exchange of goods becomes temporally separated
from the exchange of collateral. Payments systems become a means of econo-
mizing on the amount of collateral needed to enforce the pledges made. The
world has seen a variety of payments mechanisms, under both public and private
arrangements, centralized and decentralized. What are the optimal arrange-
ments for such payments systems?This paper investigates an environment in
which we can begin to address this question. We start by analyzing the develop-
ment of a private arrangement for eﬀecting payments. We consider the questions
of membership in the organization, as well as requirements for monitoring and
for the posting of collateral. We then consider a central bank-sponsored pay-
ments arrangement, where the central bank can exploit its taxation powers to
back up its promises. We examine the advantages and disadvantages of includ-
ing the central bank in the payments mechanism, and how its presence causes
a system to change.
Our analysis is most relevant for the design of “large-value” or “wholesale”
payments systems. Traditionally, these systems are used to settle obligations
between banks, as may arise from large-value commercial transactions, the op-
eration of “small-value” or “retail” payment systems (e.g., checks and credit
cards), or from the need to settle ﬁnancial market transactions. Fedwire (oper-
ated by the Federal Reserve)1 and CHIPS (operated by the New York Clearing
House) are the two preeminent large-value payment systems in the U.S.2 Large-
value payment systems typically have a hierarchical structure. At the core of
these systems is either a single institution (a central bank in the case of Fedwire
and similar systems) or a relatively small group of institutions (as in the case of
CHIPS) with special settlement privileges. A second level of the hierarchy has
institutions which may access the system, but with restrictions on access such
as position limits or additional collateral requirements. At the bottom of the hi-
erarchy are institutions who are not members of the system or are customers of
member institutions, both of whom clear and settle payments through member
institutions. A principal focus of our analysis will be to understand the purpose
of this hierarchical structure.
In ordinary circumstances the operation of public and private payment sys-
tems is, at a practical level, much the same. There are, however, some notable
diﬀerences in the legal and institutional underpinnings of public versus private
arrangements. These distinctions, largely inconsequential during normal times,
1We use the term “Fedwire” to refer to all Federal Reserve large-value payment services,
including both Fedwire and net settlement.
2See, for example, U.S. General Accounting Oﬃce (2002) for a description of Fedwire and
CHIPS. The value of payments passing through these systems is considerable: average daily
payments for 2001 were $1.2 trillion for CHIPS and $1.7 trillion for Fedwire. Other notable
large-value systems include Target (Euro area, 2001 average daily payments of about $1.3
trillion) and BOJ-Net (Japan, 2001 average daily payments of about $520 billion).
1can give rise to critical distinctions in the functionality of the two types of
system during times of duress. The ﬁrst such distinction is in the area of “ﬁnal-
ity.” A funds transfer over a public system typically represents an unconditional
transfer of a claim on a central bank. As such, it unconditionally discharges an
obligation, whereas a transfer of funds over a private system may not. For ex-
ample, in the U.S. a funds transfer over the Fedwire system automatically and
immediately becomes a liability of the Federal Reserve, and is virtually always
ﬁnal. Payments made over private systems may not carry the same degree of
ﬁnality.3
A second distinction between public and private systems can arise in the
area of credit policy. Intraday credit is an essential component of many large-
value payment systems. The demand for such credit largely arises from payment
system participants’ inability to coordinate incoming and outgoing payments.4
Both private and public payment systems may grant intraday credit, and in both
types of systems, credit risk is commonly controlled through such devices as
position limits, monitoring (e.g. bank supervision), and collateral requirements.
Membership in a public payment system, however, necessarily carries with it
a form of “credit insurance” that has no analog in a private system: that is,
while a central bank may limit the availability of intraday credit during normal
times, it cannot credibly commit to withhold credit during times of duress. In a
crisis, a central bank will always be tempted to enable the settlement of ex post
welfare-improving trades.5 This can lead to the central bank granting credit in
circumstances where, during normal times, the granting of such credit would
lead to unacceptable level of credit exposure.
In our analysis of private payments arrangements, we consider the eﬀects
of three devices in the enforcement of settlement obligations: netting, moni-
toring, and collateral. For cost of monitoring suﬃciently low, we show that
these devices should be applied in roughly in that order. Netting alone will
be adequate if all counterparties are known to be suﬃciently reliable. If some
of the counterparties involved may be too undependable, monitoring of these
counterparties—enforced by a requirement that they settle through a more re-
3In the U.S., the ﬁnality of funds transfers over private large-value systems is governed by
Article 4a of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). UCC 4a says, in eﬀect, that a payment
becomes ﬁnal as soon as the recipient’s bank (or the recipient, if the recipient is a bank) accepts
a payment instruction from the large-value payment system. In practice, such payments are
virtually always accepted. Nonetheless, the recipient (or recipient’s bank) retains the option
to refuse such payments.
The ﬁnality rules contained in UCC 4a are of course, somewhat speciﬁc to the U.S. legal
s y s t e m .W h a ti sr e l e v a n tf o ro u ra n a l y s i si sn o tt h eﬁ n a l i t yr u l e st h e m s e l v e s ,b u tt h ee x i s t e n c e
of the underlying (primarily credit) risks that these rules seek to allocate.
4For example, McAndrews and Rajan (2000) and Coleman (2002) show that payments over
Fedwire tend to peak late in the day; a lack of coordination between incoming and outgoing
payments is one reason commonly given for this pattern. A number of theoretical models
beginning with Freeman (1996) address this lack of coordination and available remedies. See
Zhou (2000) for a survey of this literature.
5The theory behind such temptation is laid out by Rochet and Tirole (1996). See also
McAndrews and Potter (2002) for a description of the Fed’s liquidity provision in the wake of
the 9/11 shock.
2liable agent—may be necessary. For still less reliable counterparties, posting of
collateral will be necessary to ensure settlement.
In most situations these three devices, when combined with suﬃcient avail-
ability of collateral, will enable agents to organize trade eﬃciently. But as
emphasized by Kocherlakota (2001), the eﬃcacy of these devices is ultimately
tied to the value of the collateral good. If there is a downward shock to collat-
eral value, then trade will break down even under net settlement, because net
settlement provides no inducement to deliver goods when there is no incentive to
pay for goods received. Settlement on the books of a central bank, by contrast,
always provides an incentive to deliver, because the value oﬀered in exchange
does not derive from the value of collateral, but instead the taxation powers
of the government. As long as the central bank makes credit freely available
(and ex post, the central bank will have an incentive to grant such credit), con-
ﬁdence in the value of central bank liabilities will be suﬃcient to sustain trade.
And to the extent that obligations incurred by payment system participants are
oﬀsetting, the central bank in equilibrium bears no loss.
The liquidity provided by public payment systems has a downside, however.
Although conﬁdence in the liabilities of the central bank can sustain trade dur-
ing crises, that same conﬁdence can undermine the incentives of payment system
participants for mutual monitoring. This is of concern if one believes the public
sector is worse at monitoring, or is less inclined to act upon the basis of infor-
mation received. As a result, this disadvantage must be given due weight in the
consideration of the relative merits of public versus private systems.
2 Literature survey
Central to the analysis below is the notion of delegated monitoring (Diamond
1984), speciﬁcally the delegation of monitoring within a payment system. The
study of strategic interactions that may arise between monitoring incentives on
the one hand, and the settlement of outstanding obligations on the other, was
introduced by Rochet and Tirole (1996) [RT], and has been extended by Fujiki,
Green, and Yamazaki (1999) [FGY]. RT show how a central bank’s “too-big-
to-fail” (TBTF) policy may dilute banks’ incentives to monitor their exposures
with other banks, including those that may arise in a payments context. FGY,
by contrast, are concerned with providing a more fundamental justiﬁcation for
public sector involvement in the payment system. To this end they show that
such involvement can be seen as a feature of (generalized) core allocations in an
economy that incorporates private information and other trading fractions. Our
approach is generally closer to that of RT in the sense that we will take certain
aspects of public sector involvement in large-value payment systems (including
TBTF) as parametric; we then consider potential interactions of such involve-
ment with monitoring incentives. Details of the model environment are closer
to FGY, however, in the sense that monitored information may be conveyed by
explicit reports, and does not have to be inferred from observed behavior.
Another crucial element of our analysis is the notion that limited enforce-
3ment frictions can sometimes be overcome by substituting public obligations for
private ones. This idea is by now a very familiar one, following such papers
as Woodford (1990), Holmström and Tirole (1998), Kocherlakota (2001), and
Köppl and MacGee (2001). What is diﬀerent below is that we explore how such
substitution may relate to the eﬃcacy of other devices for overcoming limited
enforcement, as are commonly employed in large-value payment systems.
By virtue of its subject matter, our paper is also connected to many other
papers in the burgeoning literature on the design of payments systems. Two
of the most relevant papers are Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000) [FPR] and
Holthausen and Rønde (2002) [HR]. FPR analyze the interplay between patterns
of settlement obligations, their associated potential for creating “systemic risk”
scenarios, and the eﬃcacy of various policy interventions designed to prevent
the spread of systemic risk. Our setup is similar in the sense that certain
alignments of preference shocks (and their resulting settlement obligations) can
give rise to scenarios with an elevated potential for settlement failures. The
focus of our analysis is somewhat diﬀerent, however, as we are less concerned
with the desirability of public sector bailouts per se, but instead on how the
potential for bailouts may interact with other means for lessening settlement
risk, particularly restrictions on full-ﬂedged membership in payment systems.
HR also look at issues of membership in large-value payment systems that
utilize net settlement. They show that under limited liability, there exists an
incentive for overly broad membership in these systems, since member institu-
tions may not internalize the costs of potential settlement failures. Nonetheless
decisions on membership in these systems may best be left up to the private
sector, if the private sector enjoys a signiﬁcant informational advantage over
regulators. Our analysis provides a somewhat complementary result (Corollary
16 below), i.e., if the private sector has an informational advantage over reg-
ulators, this advantage may best be exploited by restricting access to public
settlement systems.
3 The model
There are three time periods 0, 1, and 2; agents establish a payments system
in period 0, trade in period 1, and settle and consume in period 2. There are
a large and equal number of agents of three types: A, B,a n dC (Below we
will sometimes use A to mean “an agent of type A,” etc.). We will regard these
agents as centralized during periods 0 and 2, but separated on diﬀerent “islands”
during the trade period. Conceptually, it is most natural to imagine that each
trader is a two-agent household, and that at the trading round the two agents
separate, one meeting with an agent of each of the other two potential coun-
terparties. Each agent is also a potential member of various types of payment
arrangements, which will be described in more detail below.
There are four goods: an indivisible endowment good unique to each type
(goods A, B,a n dC) and a collateralizable, numeraire good. Each agent is
endowed with one unit of his type’s good (collectively known as “eponymous”
4goods) and L units of the numeraire good.
The numeraire will always be a desirable consumption good for all agents.
The endowment of the numeraire good can only be shipped to another agent
in period 2. Each of the eponymous goods is also a potential consumption
good. Agents’ preferences over these goods are determined by preference shocks
whose structure we describe below. The eponymous goods can only be shipped
to another agent in period 1. Goods diﬀer in terms of their “attachability.”
Speciﬁcally, only the numeraire good may be attached by another agent, and
then only if it has been placed in a special collateral facility. Placement of
collateral within the facility incurs the cost of a fraction λ of the good stored as
collateral.6
The economy is subject to shocks (D,E,F),w h e r eD, E,a n dF are in-
dependent. The triple D =
￿
DA,D B,D C￿
determines the costs of default for
agents of types A, B,a n dC, respectively, where this cost is measured in equiv-
alent units of the numeraire. The individual components Di ∈{ DL,D H} where
DH ￿ DL =0 . An agent whose cost is DH (DL) is said to be “reliable” (“un-
reliable”). The probability that an agent has a high default cost is known as his
“reliability.”
The shock E ∈{ 0,1} determines the “orientation” of agents’ preferences.
When E =0 , the orientation is “counterclockwise”: a type A will want to
consume type B’s endowment good, type C will want to consume type A’s
endowment good, and type B will sometimes want to consume type C’s en-
dowment good. When E =1(as occurs with probability e, 0 <e<1), the
orientation is “clockwise”: type B wants to consume type A’s endowment good,
type C wants to consume type B’s endowment good, and type A sometimes
wants to consume type C’s endowment good.
The shock F ∈{ 0,1} determines, for a given orientation, whether another
type agent (B under counterclockwise orientation, A under clockwise orienta-
tion) wants to consume C’s endowment good (in which case F =1 ,a n dt h e r ei s
“balanced demand”) or not (F =0 , and there is “unbalanced demand”). The
probability of balanced demand is given by f. Absent monitoring, the realiza-
tion of the preference shock F is private to to the type C agents. See Figure 1
for an illustration of agents’ preferences under various realizations of shocks E
and F.7
The probability distribution of the shocks D depends on the “state of the
economy,” which is publicly revealed in period 0. If there is a panic (as occurs
with probability 1 − n), then all agents are known to be unreliable. During
normal times (which occur with probability n)t y p e sA and B have default
costs equal to DH with probability one–i.e., A and B are known to be reliable.
6Think of this as a simple production process for generating collateral. Many papers have
dealt with the beneﬁts of collateral in allowing trade to occur between unreliable parties. This
paper will focus on collateral as the expensive alternative to other payments arrangements.
7Clearly it is possible to construct models with more types of agents and more complex
patterns of payments; see, e.g., Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000). What is important for our
s e t u pi st h a ts o m er i s k ya g e n t ss o m e t i m e sd e s i r et om a k ep a y m e n t st h a ta r en o ta l w a y so ﬀ s e t
by incoming payments by other agents.
5Figure 1: The ﬂow of eponymous goods
Type C is reliable with probability rC.T y p eC’s learn whether or not they are
reliable in period 0. By incurring a disutility equal to M>0,a g e n t sA or B
c a nm o n i t o ra n dt h e r e b yl e a r nw h e t h e rC is reliable, with certainty, at the same
time that C learns this information.
The information obtained by monitoring cannot be veriﬁed by an outside
party, hence the costs of monitoring cannot be shared. Information obtained
by a private monitor thus remains private until it is willingly revealed by the
monitor. A penalty equal to a disutility of X ￿ 0 m a yb ea p p l i e db ya n
enforcement authority (a social planner or a clearing organization) to monitors
whose reports turn out to be false, i.e., in cases where a monitor reports a type
C to be reliable who subsequently defaults.8
Events proceed as follows (see Table 1 below for a summary). In period 0,
if a panic has not occurred, then agents of type A or B,o rb o t h ,c a nd e c i d et o
monitor agents of type C. Agents then have the option of placing collateral in
the collateral facility. Next, at the beginning of period 1, preference shock E
is learned and each agent has a representative travel to the location where his
potential supplier produces. Once there, purchaser and supplier learn whether
their trade will be desired (in other words, C and the demander of C’s good
learn F), immediately followed by trading in commodities A, B,a n dC in return
for promises of period 2 transfers of the numeraire good. Given the separation
8We assume that the application of the penalty for false reports is deterministic. Introduc-
ing stochastic penalties could lead to welfare gains but would not substantively change the
results derived below.
6during the trading period, the only feasible trades are trades of current delivery
of an eponymous good in return for future delivery of the numeraire good.
Contingent trades (for example, of the form, “I will deliver good A to you
provided someone else delivers good B to me”) are not permitted, i.e., the
representative must make an arrangement independent of the arrangement made
by his partner. For the moment we are ruling out pure “spot” (aka “delivery
versus payment” or DVP) transactions of goods for immediate payment. Trades
are private information between the two agents involved while the trades are
occuring, but become known to other agents as soon as all trading is ﬁnished. In
period 2, agents may then make their pledged numeraire transfers, or default. If
default occurs, the defaulting agent’s creditor may attach the agent’s collateral
up to the amount of the pledge. Finally, consumption occurs.
Table 1: Sequence of events in the model
Period 0a. State of the economy is learned (panic or no panic)
0b. Agents agree to be monitored (or not)
0c. Reliability revealed to agents and monitor
0d. Announcements of monitors & collateral choice
Period 1a. Orientation of trade E is learned
1b. Agents travel to other islands
1c. Preference shocks F revealed (balance of demand)
1d. Trade in eponymous goods
1e. Trades revealed
Period 2a. Transfer of numeraire good (or default)
2b. Attachment of collateral
2c. Consumption
Formally, preferences of a type-i agent (i = A,B,C) are given by the expec-

















j is agent i’s consumption of good j, δ
i is an indicator for agent i’s
default decision, µi is an indicator for agent i’s decision (i = A,B) to monitor,
and ξ
i is an indicator of whether the monitor is discovered to have ﬁled a false
report. The consumption weights si
j are (E,F) - measurable and indicate “single
coincidences” of wants; in particular
si
j =1if j = ￿ (2)
si
j = α ∈ (0,1) if i = j (3)
In addition,
sA
B =1− E (4)
sA
C = EF (5)
7sB
A = E (6)
sB
C =( 1− E)F (7)
sC
A =1− E (8)
sC
B = E (9)
The utility of consumption vi is given by
vi(c)=w(c) (10)
for i = A,B,w h e r ew￿(c) is a step function:
w￿ (c)=w if c<α+ L (11)
= w if c>α+ L
and 0 <w< 1 < w.F o ra g e n tC the utility of consumption is given by
vC(c)=c (12)
4 The planner’s problem
An allocation in this economy is a vector (µ,￿,c,δ) that determines respectively
agents’ monitoring, collateral postings, consumption and default decisions. An
optimal allocation maximizes the expected utility of type C agents
EuC (13)












and the individual rationality constraints for A and B
EuA ≥ w(α + L) (16)
EuB ≥ w(α + L) (17)
We will study non-autarkic allocations in which all opportunities for trade are
exploited and default does not occur. For such allocations consumption of the
eponymous goods will be given by
cA
s(A) =1 − E(1 − F) (18)
cB




C =1 − F (21)
8where
s(i)=i +2 E − 1( m o d2 ) (22)
i.e., s(i) denotes i’s “supplier” under a given orientation of trade.9
Limited enforcement (non-attachability of goods not posted) imposes ad-
ditional constraints on non-autarkic, no-default allocations. When demand is











s(i) + α + L − ￿i − Di
￿
for i = A,B,C (23)
When demand is balanced, the limited enforcement constraints (23) guarantee
that agent i will have an incentive to trade his eponymous good to the next per-
son in the “credit chain” (i.e., s−1(i)=i−2E+1), rather than to simply accept
s(i)’s eponymous good and hang on to his own. In other words constraints (23)
require that
vi(consuming s(i)’s eponymous good + consuming numeraire good)
≥ vi(cons. s(i)’s eponymous good + cons. own eponymous good (24)
+numeraire endowment − loss of collateral − default cost)
For a reliable agent (Di = DH) the limited enforcement constraint will never
bind, but it may bind for an unreliable agent (Di =0 ). In the latter case the
constraints reduce to
ci
￿ ≥ α + L − ￿i (25)
When demand is not balanced (F =0 ) then the limited enforcement con-




￿ + α ≥ cC
s(C) + α + L − ￿C (26)
which reduces to
cC
￿ ≥ L − ￿C (27)
This constraint says that C’s consumption of the numeraire good cannot fall
below what he could get by walking away from his collateral.
For monitoring to occur, additional restrictions must be placed on the plan-
ner’s problem. Without loss of generality suppose that an agent A agrees to
monitor an agent C.L e tD
C indicate A’s report on C’s reliability. By a slight
abuse of notation, let cA ￿
D
C￿
represent the appropriately weighted sum of A’s
consumption, conditional on his report. Then, truth-telling conditions on the














9To keep notation compact, the expression for s(i) makes use of the obvious mapping from
{A,B,C} to the integers (mod 2).
10In general we should see expected utilities in the truth-telling conditions (28) and (29), i.e.,
cA should be stochastic. However, in the solutions studied below, A and B will be completely
insured by C against all risks (other than that of monitoring a type C and ﬁnding him to be















Condition (28) guarantees that the monitor will report a reliable party as reli-
able, whereas (29) guarantees that an unreliable party will also be reported as
such. For a suﬃciently stringent penalty X on false reports, it can be shown that
(28) will bind while (29) will never bind. For monitoring to occur, it must also
be individually rational for A to undertake the monitoring, i.e., the expected













− M ≥ w(α + L) (30)







= w(α + L) (31)
In other words, a monitor who reports a type C to be unreliable simply receives
his autarky level of consumption. The consumption of a monitor who reports a







= w(α + L)+M/rC (32)
4.1 Full-enforcement benchmark
We begin by considering a benchmark allocation, the solution to the planner’s
problem under full enforcement (i.e., what would be obtainable if all goods
were attachable at zero cost, or if all agents were always reliable). In this
case, if demand is balanced, then all agents both deliver a good and receive
a good. If demand is not balanced, then C and s(C) receive goods, while
s(C) and s−1(C) deliver them. Any numeraire good beyond what is required
to fulﬁll the individual rationality constraints (16) and (17) is transferred to
C. Straightforward algebra then yields the following as the optimal allocation




￿ = L − ((1 − E)+EF)+α (34)
cB
￿ = cB∗
￿ = L − (E +( 1− E)F)+α (35)
cC
￿ = cC∗
￿ = L +( 1+F)(1 − α) − (1 − F)α (36)
4.2 Optimal allocations under limited enforcement
We begin our analysis of allocations under limited enforcement by considering
a special case. Suppose that panics do not occur and C is always unreliable. In
this case, there is no return to monitoring, and the planner’s problem reduces
to the constrained-optimal choice of consumption and collateral.
We ﬁrst consider the subcase where demand is always balanced. Assuming
that all trades take place, let T be the maximum total amount of numeraire that
A and B are willing to transfer to C under balanced demand, i.e., T =2 ( 1−α).
10Then the limited enforcement constraint (25) implies that C will only need to
post collateral of













to ensure that he will deliver his eponymous good.
Next we consider the subcase where demand is never balanced (f =0 ). Then
C’s limited enforcement constraint becomes, from (27)
cC
￿ ≥ L − ￿C ⇐⇒




where Q indicates a net transfer of the numeraire good from C to other agents.
In this case an “open credit chain” runs from C to C’s supplier, i.e., s(C),t o
s(C)’s supplier, s−1(C). Individual rationality constraints (16) and (17) require
that C’s supplier receive at least α of the numeraire good as compensation. Not
all of this need come from C. However the surplus available for redistribution
is only half of what is available in the case of balanced trade, i.e., in this case
we set T =1− α, yielding







More generally, when there is a positive probability of both balanced and
unbalanced demand, the ﬁrst-best allocation is described in the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 1 Suppose that demand is not always balanced (f<1),t h a tC
is known to be unreliable (rC =0 ), and that panics are not possible (n =1 ).
Then for λ>0 suﬃciently small and w suﬃciently large, the solution to the
planner’s problem is given by (18)-(21) and
￿A,B =0 (40)















￿ − λ￿Cu (44)
T =1 − α (45)
Proof. (Sketch) This is simply the solution to the planner’s problem when
demand is not balanced; since it incorporates a collateral requirement that is
more stringent than for balanced demand, it insures that type C agents will
11always honor their obligations. If C posts any less collateral, C will default
with positive probability, with an arbitrarily large social cost as w grows with-
out bound. If λ=0, then by posting collateral C can costlessly insure A and B
against default; by standard arguments such insurance is always socially pre-
ferred. By continuity, such insurance is also preferred so long as it is suﬃciently
cheap (i.e., λ is suﬃciently small).
We now consider the case where 0 <r C < 1 so that C is potentially reliable,
but not always so. Then C’s performance can always be insured by requiring
collateral as described above, but this requirement carries with it an expected
social cost of rCλ￿Cu, relative to full information.
An alternative to collateral is for one of C’s potential counterparties (either A
or B but not both) to monitor. In general monitoring will be socially preferable
to collateral (i.e., provide cheaper performance on the part of C)a sl o n ga st h e
cost of monitoring M is outweighed by the beneﬁts of posting less collateral.
Relative to a world without monitoring, there are two potential complica-
tions. The ﬁrst is the non-veriﬁability of monitored information. In other words
the designated monitor must have an incentive to truthfully reveal the outcome
of the monitoring process to the social planner. From condition (32) above, this
requires that the type C’s must pay a “fee” of h units of the numeraire when
they are discovered to be reliable, where h is implicitly deﬁned as
w(α + L + h)=w(α + L)+M/rC (46)
The second complication is that the cost of monitoring M must somehow be
oﬀset (in expectation), so that monitoring is individually rational. From (31),
however, it follows that A or B is willing to bear this cost for the prospect of
receiving the fee h when the monitored party C turns out to be reliable.
The solution to the planner’s problem in the case of monitoring thus has a
particularly simple form. If the type C’s are found to be reliable, the solution
is the same as under full enforcement, except that each type C must pay the
fee h to his monitor. If the type C’s are found to be unreliable, the solution is
the same as in Proposition 1. Formally we have:
Proposition 2 Suppose that demand is not always balanced (f<1), that C
is sometimes but not always reliable (0 <r C < 1), and that panics are not
possible (n =1 ). Then for λ,M > 0 suﬃciently small and w suﬃciently large,
12the solution to the planner’s problem is given by (18)-(21) and
￿A,B =0 (47)

































µA + µB =1 (53)
T =1 − α (54)
We now consider optimal allocations in panics. Recall that all agents are
known to be unreliable when a panic occurs. Accordingly trade can only pro-
ceed if collateral is posted. In the case of balanced demand, agents’ incentive
constraints are given by (25). These cannot hold simultaneously in the absence
of collateral. To see this, consider a candidate allocation in which no collat-
eral is posted and none of the numeraire good changes hands, i.e., ￿i =0and
ci = L for all i. Clearly this allocation violates the incentive constraint (25)
for all agents. And, unless collateral is posted, there is no way the planner can
redistribute the numeraire good across agents so that all incentive constraints
can simultaneously hold.
What is the minimum amount of collateral needed?We can sum the balanced-








Substituting (55) into the resource constraint for the numeraire good (15) yields













Mimicking our approach for the normal state, we now calculate the minimum
level of collateral necessary for C to completely insure A and B against default,
without violating individual rationality for A and B. When demand is balanced,
this is given by (57) at equality. When demand is not balanced, then s−1(C)
requires compensation equal to the reservation value of s−1(C)’s eponymous
good, plus the cost of posting suﬃcient collateral to satisfy (57), i.e., a transfer
13R of numeraire good given by











Not all of this need come from C;i nf a c ts(C) c a nc o n t r i b u t eu pt o
S =
1 − α − λ
1 − λ
(59)
without violating his incentive or individual rationality constraints (as long as
α>1/2). Accordingly, C’s collateral posting for the panic state must satisfy
￿C ≥ R −
￿




but (60) is redundant given (57) for λ close to zero. We can now state the
solution to the planner’s problem in a more general case:
Proposition 3 Suppose that demand is not always balanced (f<1), that C is
sometimes but not always reliable (0 <r C < 1), that panics are possible (n<1),
and that α>1/2. Then for λ,M > 0 suﬃciently small and w suﬃciently large,
when a panic does not occur, the solution to the planner’s problem is given in
Proposition 2; when a panic occurs, the solution is given by (18)-(21) and





￿ = L − ((1 − E)+EF)S + E(1 − F)R − λ￿p (62)
cB
￿ = L − (E +( 1− E)F)S +( 1− E)(1 − F)R − λ￿p (63)
cC
￿ = L − λ￿p +( 1+F)S − (1 − F)R (64)
where R and S are given by (58) and (59) respectively.
Proof. (Sketch) The proposed panic-state solution maximizes C’s utility
subject to the constraint that no agent ever defaults. For w large, this outcome
is socially desirable if λ =0 , and by continuity, for λ close to zero.
5 Implementation with private payment systems
In this section we consider whether certain arrangements (games) can implement
the optimal allocations described above. We consider three sorts of arrange-
ments which diﬀer according to the structure of their “payment systems.” A
payment system is taken as a set of rules that determines how obligations aris-
ing during the trading stage may be extinguished. In the initial period, the
agents jointly decide whether to join the payment system; we will not model
this participation game in detail.
14In the ﬁrst two arrangements, there is no possibility of monitoring: an agent
i’s strategy is given by the vector σi =( ￿i,b i,t i,d i),w h e r e￿i denotes i’s col-
lateral posting, bi denotes i’s decision to enter in a period 1 trade to buy an
eponymous good of type s(i) in return for a pledged delivery of a certain amount
of the numeraire good, ti denotes i’s period 1 decision to trade his eponymous
good to an s−1(i) type agent for a similar pledge, and di indicates an agent’s
period 2 decision to either settle or default on the obligations that arise dur-
ing the trading stage. We restrict our analysis to symmetric equilibria in pure
strategies, in which both trade and settlement occur, and in which the prices of
the eponymous goods are symmetric across markets. The price of each epony-
mous good i, in terms of the numeraire good, must clear the market for that
good in the standard Walrasian sense, and is denoted Pi.
5.1 Arrangement 1: trade with a collateral facility
In the ﬁrst of the three arrangements, there is no “payment system” in the
traditional sense, but the collateral facility is available to facilitate settlement.
That is, each trade is settled independent of all other trades, by the transfer of an
appropriate amount of the numeraire good. Agents can post collateral as a way
of committing to settle their obligations.11 If a default occurs, the defaulter’s
collateral is seized by “the legal system” and transferred to the creditor of the
defaulter.
A potentially unreliable agent cannot be trusted to settle a trading obliga-
tion, without having posted collateral. Suppose demand is balanced, and that
an agent C has delivered his eponymous good to a type A or B in return for a
promised payment of PC ∈ [α,1], and has likewise taken delivery of an epony-
mous good from another agent, for a promised payment Ps(C).T h e ni no r d e r
for C to always settle in period 2, the following condition must be satisﬁed
1+PC − Ps(C) + L − λ￿C ≥ 1+PC + L − ￿C (65)
w h i c hi nw o r d ss a y st h a tf o rt h et y p eC agent,
(consumption of supplier’s good) + (payment from demander)
−(payment to supplier) + (endowment of numeraire good)
−(loss from posting collateral) (66)
≥ (consumption of supplier’s good) + (payment from demander)
+(numeraire endowment) − (collateral lost in default)






11We are assuming that the collateral facility can keep track of trading postions so that no
one can trade for more than one unit of an eponymous good.
15When demand is not balanced (F =0 ), the same condition can be shown to
apply. Suﬃcient collateral must be posted so that condition (67) will hold for
all market-clearing prices P ∈ [α,1], i.e., C must post suﬃcient collateral so
that




The potentially unreliable agent C must also have an incentive to deliver his
eponymous good when it is demanded by another agent (i.e., when demand is
balanced). This requires that
1+PC − Ps(C) + L − λ￿C ≥ 1+α + L − ￿C (69)
which under symmetric prices is equivalent to




Condition (70) is implied by the previous condition (68). Equilibrium allocations
for arrangement 1 can now be described:
Proposition 4 Suppose that C is not always reliable (rC < 1), and that panics
are not possible (n =1 ). Then under arrangement 1, for λ>0 suﬃciently small
and w suﬃciently large, equilibrium allocations are given by (18)-(21) and
￿A,B =0 (71)






￿ = L + E(1 − F)P (73)
cB
￿ = cB∗∗
￿ = L +( 1− E)(1 − F)P (74)
cC
￿ = cC∗∗
￿ = L − λ￿C1 − (1 − F)P (75)
P ∈ [α,1] (76)
5.2 Arrangement 2: multilateral net settlement
The next arrangement we consider is “multilateral net settlement” among all
agents. After trading, settlement occurs in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage (at the
end of period 1), agents’ net positions are calculated vis-a-vis all other agents.
Each agents’ original obligation is then replaced by his net obligation. In the
second stage (in period 2), agents having positive net obligations may discharge
these by transfer of their numeraire good to the payment system; these transfers
are then distributed to net creditors.12
The crucial diﬀerence between this arrangement and the arrangement 1 is
that under balanced demand, settlement is automatic in symmetric equilibrium,
12What we have in mind is a “strong” form of net settlement where substitution of the net
obligation for the original (gross) obligation is legally binding. In other words, a default at
the second stage does not aﬀect the recasting of obligations that took place at the ﬁrst stage.
In securities industry parlance this is sometimes known as “netting by novation.”
16so that the “settlement” constraint (68) is no longer applicable for that case.
That is, under net settlement rules, an agent who is in a zero net position after
period 1 has no opportunity for default. When demand is not balanced, however,
then (68) continues to apply—an agent in a net debit position after trading must
still have an incentive to settle. In addition, the “delivery” incentive constraint
(70) still applies—agents must have an incentive to trade, no matter what the
rules are concerning settlement. In short, under multilateral net settlement the
following results are immediate:
Proposition 5 Suppose that demand is not always balanced (f<1), that C is
not always reliable (rC < 1), and that panics are not possible (n =1 ). Then
for λ>0 suﬃciently small and w suﬃciently large, equilibrium allocations of
arrangement 2 are the same as those under arrangement 1. If however, demand
is always balanced (f =1 ), the unique equilibrium allocation of arrangement 2












￿ = L (80)
cC
￿ = L − λ￿C2 (81)
Corollary 6 When demand is always balanced (f =1 ), the equilibrium allo-
cation under multilateral net settlement dominates the equilibrium allocation in
the absence of a payment system.
Corollary 7 The ﬁrst-best allocation of Proposition 1 is not attainable as an
equilibrium of arrangement 1 (trading without a payment system) or of arrange-
ment 2 (multilateral net settlement).
Corollary 8 The equilibrium allocations of both arrangement 1 (no payment
system) and arrangement 2 (multilateral net settlement) converge (almost surely)
to the ﬁrst-best allocation of Proposition 1 as α ↑ 1.
Uncoordinated (symmetric) outcomes are ineﬃcient under either arrange-
ments 1 or 2, essentially because these trading arrangements provide no oppor-
t u n i t yf o ra g e n t st oc o m m i tt ot r a d et h e i re p o n y m o u sg o o d sa tt h e i rr e s e r v a t i o n
value; nor do A and B have an incentive to “donate” surplus to the unreliable
type C’s so as to lower C’s collateral requirement. However net settlement is
always preferred for the special case where demand is always balanced. Also
both equilibrium allocations approach eﬃciency as the reservation value of the
eponymous goods more closely matches their market value.
5.3 Arrangement 3: hierarchical net settlement
If C is potentially reliable (0 <r C < 1), there can be payoﬀs to monitoring
(less resources tied up in collateral) when monitoring is suﬃciently inexpensive.
17The value of any information obtained via monitoring is limited by its non-
veriﬁability, however. A type-C agent may agree to be monitored by a type-
A or type-B agent, but when the orientation of demand is uncertain (0 <
e<1), such information may be useless ex post. Monitoring by both types
of potential counterparties is clearly duplicative and cannot be eﬃcient. We
therefore consider the third type of arrangement, hierarchical net settlement.
Under this arrangement, trading and settlement are identical to arrangement
2, except that type C’s are excluded from directly settling with other agents.
Accordingly, a type A or B must serve as the “settlement agent” for each agent
of type C. Becoming a settlement agent means that the settlement agent must
monitor C and make a report to other payment system participants on C’s
reliability. The monitor must also honor C’s obligations as if they were his
own. Settlement consists of an instantaneous sequence of net settlements: ﬁrst,
between C and C’s settlement agent, then among A and B. The burden of any
default by C is thus borne by C’s monitor; in addition to the loss of numeraire
good, the payment system may impose a nonpecuniary penalty X on monitors
when their “customers” default.
C may either post collateral or agree to be monitored ﬁrst. If C is monitored
and found to be unreliable, ensuring settlement in all cases requires that C post
suﬃcient collateral such that (68) holds. If C is found to be reliable, C’s monitor
may charge C af e eh￿ to oﬀset the costs of monitoring (as was the case with
planner’s problem analyzed above). Truth-telling conditions analogous to (28)
and (29), and an individual rationality condition analogous to (30) allow us to











where EE,F denotes expectation with respect to the random variables E and F,
and cA
∗ denotes the sum of the monitor’s consumption in an allocation without
monitoring, such as described in Proposition 4.13 We can now state:
Proposition 9 Suppose that demand is not always balanced (f<1), that C
is sometimes but not always reliable (0 <r C < 1), and that panics are not
possible (n =1 ). Then for λ,M > 0 suﬃciently small and w suﬃciently large,
13As in the planner’s problem, (82) can be stated in somewhat simpliﬁed form because we
are analyzing equilibria in which the monitor’s equilibrium consumption does not fall below
his autarky level.
18equilibrium allocations of arrangement 3 are given by (18)-(21) and
￿A,B =0 (83)








￿ + µAχ{DC = DH}h￿ (85)
cB
￿ = cB∗∗
￿ + µBχ{DC = DH}h￿ (86)
cC
￿ = cC∗∗





µA + µB =1 (89)
Corollary 10 The ﬁrst-best allocation of Proposition 2 is not attainable as an
equilibrium of arrangement 3 (hierarchical net settlement), but equilibrium al-
locations of arrangement 3 approach the ﬁrst-best allocation (almost surely) as
α ↑ 1.
Corollary 11 Under the hypotheses of the proposition, arrangement 3 (hierar-
chical net settlement) dominates both arrangement 1 (no payment system) and
arrangement 2 (multilateral net settlement).
Proof. (Sketch) The proposition and corollary 11 follow immediately from
the discussion above. Corollary 10 follows from Proposition 3 and the observa-
tion that ￿C3 >￿ Cm when C is found to be unreliable.
Finally we consider the impact of panics on equilibrium allocations. In a
panic all parties are unreliable and must post collateral satisfying at least the
delivery incentive condition (70). In the absence of a payment system, additional
collateral would be required at the settlement stage, i.e., each agent would post
collateral suﬃcient to satisfy (68). Under net settlement (arrangements 2 or 3),
this more stringent collateral position would only apply to agents who would
normally be expected to end period 1 in a net debit position, i.e. agent C.
Accordingly, in a panic state, equilibrium allocations of all three arrangements
would be given as in the following:
Proposition 12 Suppose that panics are possible (n<1). Then when a panic
occurs, equilibrium allocations under arrangement 1 is given by (18)-(21) and






￿ − λ￿A (91)
cB
￿ = cB∗∗
￿ − λ￿B (92)
cC
￿ = L − λ￿C1 − (1 − F)P (93)
P ∈ [α,1] (94)





19when demand is not always balanced (f<1); when demand is always balanced





Corollary 13 The ﬁrst-best allocation of Proposition 3 is not attainable as
an equilibrium of any of the arrangements; however equilibrium allocations of
arrangement 3 approach the ﬁrst-best (almost surely) as α ↑ 1.
Corollary 14 When a panic occurs, any equilibrium allocation of arrangement
1 is dominated by some equilibrium allocation of arrangements 2 or 3.
In summary, relative to a world without a payment system, multilateral and
hierarchical net settlement may be seen as successively better approximations
to ﬁrst-best outcomes. Netting by itself can economize on collateral as long as
demand is balanced (Corollary 6). Imposing a hierarchy on net settlement gen-
erates further gains, by restricting the use of collateral to bad credits (Corollary
11). However netting is less eﬀective in a panic, when collateral is necessary to
generate incentives to trade (Proposition 12).
6 Settling on the books of a central bank
We now analyze a trading game where settlement occurs on the books of the
central bank. Central bank liabilities have value because a fourth type of agent,
taxpayers, must exchange their endowment of the numeraire good for central
bank liabilities in order to pay taxes to the government.
Under this new arrangement (arrangement 4), period 1 trades no longer
consist of exchanges of private promises for period 2 deliveries of the numeraire
good, in return for period 1 deliveries of an eponymous good. Instead, transac-
tions are “spot” transactions of eponymous goods in return for a credit entry on
the supplier’s central bank account.14 All transactions in central bank claims
are ﬁnal. Since agents of type A, B,a n dC are not endowed with central bank
claims in period 0, they can only obtain these by borrowing them from the
central bank in period 1, in the form of “overdrafts” on their account, i.e., cred-
its against promised delivery of the numeraire good in period 2. The central
bank may or may not require collateral when it grants these overdrafts. By
assumption the central bank cannot monitor.
In this expanded environment, we will wish to consider allocations in which
default can occur. If the central bank grants uncollateralized credit to an agent
and the agent defaults, the default must be covered by the taxpayers, whose
losses are incorporated in the social planner’s objective. Taxpayers are assumed
to be endowed with suﬃcient numeraire to cover any default. Central bank
14Implicit in our analysis is the reasonable notion that a public can provide DVP (or at
least a close approximation to it) more cheaply than a private system could.
20claims that left outstanding after the settlement stage (i.e., any net debit po-
sitions that are in default) carry a social cost of π>0 per claim outstanding,
which is borne by the taxpayers.
As a benchmark we consider symmetric pure-strategies equilibria of a trading
game, characterized by the following payment system: suppose that all agents
always have central bank accounts, as well as access to zero-interest uncollat-
eralized overdraft credit during the trading period. Since there is no doubt
concerning the value of central bank claims, trade always occurs in such an en-
vironment. The only uncertainty is whether agents will default. The likelihood
of default depends on two factors, the ﬁrst being the extent to which all trades
are oﬀsetting, and the second being the value of agents’ default shocks D.I fa l l
trades are oﬀsetting then the value of the default shocks is irrelevant because
there is nothing for an agent to default on: since all payment is in the form of
credits and debits on the books of the central bank, oﬀsetting book entries are
in eﬀect subject to a form of net settlement. If all transactions do not net out to
zero, then an agent will default if and only if he experiences a low default-cost
shock (given the structure of demand shocks this can only happen for agent C).














(1 − F)P (100)
P ∈ [α,1] (101)
The desirability of this arrangement vis-a-vis the private arrangement de-
pends critically on the structure of the demand shocks:
Proposition 15 As f ↑ 1, arrangement 4 is preferred to the private arrange-
m e n t s1 ,2 ,a n d3 .
Proof. Under arrangement 4, the expected social loss (due to potential








(1 − f)P (102)
since a default by C occurs on a promised payment P when either (1) there is no
panic, C is unreliable, and demand is not balanced, as occurs with probability
n(1−rC)(1−f); or (2) if a panic occurs and demand is not balanced, as occurs
with probability (1 − n)(1−f). These probabilities become arbitrarily small for
f suﬃciently close to 1. Hence as f approaches 1, (102) is less than the cost of
collateral or monitoring necessary to sustain trade under a private arrangement.
Corollary 16 As f ↑ 1 and α ↑ 1, equilibrium allocations of arrangement 4
converge (almost surely) to the full-enforcement allocation.
21Proposition 15 and Corollary 16 demonstrate the appeal of central-bank op-
erated payment systems. That is, settling on the books of a central bank can
at least partially overcome problems of limited enforcement, without resorting
to costly measures such as collateral or monitoring. Relative to wholly uncoor-
dinated payments (i.e., arrangement 1 above) a central-bank operated payment
system (arrangement 4) oﬀers two channels for improvement. The ﬁrst is the de
facto netting of oﬀsetting payments, while the second is the substitution of the
government’s claims on the taxpayers for private claims. If demand is always
balanced, these two channels work in perfect conjunction and the problem of
limited enforcement vanishes.
The downside of this arrangement is, of course, that demand may not always
be balanced and taxpayer losses may result. For unfavorable parameter values
(π too large, n, f,o rrCtoo small) the expected cost to the taxpayers, i.e., (102),
may be large enough to wipe out the social gains of central bank settlement.
Clearly, the central bank could always limit its exposure by only granting credit
against collateral. Always requiring collateral would eliminate the possibility
of transfer from the taxpayers but also wipes out the potential welfare gains of
settling on the books of the central bank.
An alternative means of limiting the central bank’s exposure is to restrict
access to central bank settlement. Consider a hierarchical variation on arrange-
ment 4, in which only A and B enjoy access to central bank settlement with
uncollateralized daylight overdraft privileges. Agents of type C do not enjoy
access to central bank settlement services but instead must settle through an
agent of type A or B. During normal times, equilibrium allocations under this
new arrangement (arrangement 5) will be given by Proposition 9. C will be
monitored by his settlement agent, and, if found to be unreliable, will be re-
quired to post collateral (if found to be reliable, he pays a fee to his settlement
agent).
During panics, neither A nor B is required to post collateral. But C’s
settlement agent will still require C to post collateral before agreeing to settle
C’s transactions. To guarantee settlement under all demand structures and
market prices, the more stringent collateral requirement (68) is necessary. In
summary, we have
Proposition 17 Suppose that f<1. Under arrangement 5, during normal
times equilibrium allocations are as in Proposition 9. During panics they are






Arrangement 5 thus falls in between a private hierarchical arrangement
(arrangement 3) and universal access to central bank settlement (arrangement
4). Relative to the private arrangement it oﬀers the advantage of requiring less
collateral during panics. Relative to arrangement 4, it reduces central bank
exposure, but imposes collateral costs on parties lacking central bank access.
22Evidently, arrangement 4 will be socially preferred to arrangement 5 as f ap-
proaches unity.
7 Policy implications
A b o v ew eh a v es e e nt h a tac e n t r a l - b a n ko p e r a t e da r r a n g e m e n tm a yo ﬀ e rb o t h
potential advantages and disadvantages as compared to private payment arrange-
ments. If the pattern of payments is predicable enough, or if all potential pay-
ment system participants are reliable enough, then settling on the books of a
central bank can provide eﬃciency gains by economizing on the use of costly
collateral or monitoring. On the other hand, too widespread access to central
bank settlement services can have reduce the eﬃciency gains from private-sector
monitoring of risky counterparties. Most modern large-value payment systems,
which typically incorporate both public and private elements, may be seen as
attempts to reﬁne this tradeoﬀ. Below we describe some features of these sys-
tems, and use the model laid out above to evaluate their potential for eﬃciency
gains.
A feature shared by all large-value payment systems is a certain degree of
hierarchy. Particularly for systems that settle on the books of a central bank,
membership is typically restricted to banks or bank-like institutions. Proposi-
tion 17 spells out a potential rationale for this restriction, namely that such a
hierarchy allows monitoring to substitute for collateral and/or taxpayer guar-
antees. But this rationale becomes less compelling as average payments volume
(i.e., the parameter f in our model) rises for non-members (i.e., agents of type
C).
Another avenue for limiting central bank credit exposure is for central banks
to only grant intraday credit against collateral. This policy has been adopted by
a number of prominent large-value systems, including Target (Euro-area) and
BOJ-Net (Japan).15 As mentioned above, the downside of such a policy is the
cost of posting collateral. In some cases (particularly for Target), central banks
have tried to minimize collateral costs by adopting liberal policies concerning
the types of assets of collateral that may be posted, and generous valuations
or “haircuts” associated with various types of assets. Fedwire, the large-value
payment system operated by the Federal Reserve, has adopted a less conserva-
tive approach, allowing some participants access to free intraday credit (up to
certain limits) but requiring riskier institutions to post collateral.16
O u ra n a l y s i ss u g g e s t st h a ts u c hc o l l a t e r a lr e q u i r e m e n t sm a yn o ta l w a y se l i m -
inate a central bank’s exposure to credit risk. In the event of a widespread shock
to participants’ net worth (a “panic” in the model), the amount of collateral
15See Bank of Japan (1997) for information on collateralized intraday credit over BOJ-
Net. The corresponding information for Target is available on the European Central Bank’s
website, www.ecb.int.
16A full description of the Federal Reserve’s policies on Payment System Risk is available
online at www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/psr/. See also Coleman (2002) for a history
o ft h eF e d e r a lR e s e r v e ’ sp o l i c i e si nt h i sa r e a .
23required to completely eradicate the central bank’s exposure could well be exces-
sive. Consequently in such situations there will be a temptation for the central
bank to suspend the requirement and to provide many, if not all participants
un- or undercollateralized credit, on the likely chance that the resulting expo-
sure will be largely eliminated through netting. Indeed it could be argued that
central banks’ ability and willingness (at least ex post) to serve as “intraday
lender of last resort” provides the most compelling rationale for central banks’
provision of settlement services.
The continued existence of privately operated, large-value payment systems
might suggest that this last advantage is not decisive. But private systems
are to some extent dependent on liquidity provided by a central bank. The
clearest case of this can be found in CHAPS, the U.K.’s large-value payment
system, which is privately operated but which settles on the books of the Bank
of England. In this system, liquidity is provided by intraday repos (essentially,
collateralized intraday loans) with the Bank of England.17 Canada’s Large
Value Transfer System (LVTS) is another privately operated large value system.
It operates as a multilateral net settlement system, but has been provided an
explicit guarantee against settlement failures by the Bank of Canada (see Dingle
1998). By contrast, CHIPS (the large-value payment system operated by the
New York Clearing House Association), enjoys no explicit guarantee against
settlement failures. But the current design of CHIPS allows for payments not
settled through normal procedures to be transferred to Fedwire at the end of
the day (Intraday Liquidity Management Task Force 2000).
The importance of a central-bank operated “backup” can be illustrated
through an elaboration of our model of multilateral net settlement (arrange-
ment 2 above). Suppose that agents in arrangement 2 have, in addition to
their access to the multilateral net settlement system, access to a central-bank
operated payment system. Agents can settle their period 1 transactions either
through netting and delivery of the numeraire good, or alternatively by drawing
on their account at the central bank.
If no collateral were required under this new arrangement and if the cen-
tral bank were to operate as arrangement 4 above (with zero-interest, uncol-
lateralized daylight overdrafts), then the new arrangement would have same
equilibrium allocations as arrangement 4. Under balanced demand, settlement
obligations would completely net out at the end of period 1. If demand were
not balanced and all agents were reliable, settlement would be completed in the
second stage. Finally, an agent unable to settle in the second stage could draw
upon his credit line at the central bank to eﬀect settlement. The advantage of
this “backup” settlement stage is that payments ﬁnality under this new arrange-
ment would be virtually identical to that under a central-bank operated system;
agents trading with a participant in this new arrangement would be guaranteed
payment without resorting to costly credit or monitoring. However the disad-
vantage would be the same as under arrangement 4, which is that credit risk
17See Buckle and Campbell (2002) for a model of the CHAPS system that incorporates the
Bank of England’s intraday liquidity provision.
24would be concentrated at the central bank.
In practice, private large-value payment systems do not enjoy the sort of
“carte blanche” backup that is provided by the arrangement described above.
Membership in these systems is restricted; collateral is required; and access to
central bank credit may be subject to the sorts of restrictions described above.
Nonetheless we would argue that the presence of backup liquidity through the
central bank aﬀords the members of private payment systems assurances that
promised payments will be made, without posting the quantity of collateral that
would be necessary to provide such guarantees in a purely private context.
8 Summary
The chief purpose of large-value payment systems is to eﬃciently provide assur-
ances that payment obligations will be discharged. In a world where payment
system participants are not always trustworthy (and if they were, there would be
little need for elaborate payment systems), a number of devices can be employed
to provide such assurance. These include the posting of collateral, monitoring,
netting, and the substitution of public-sector obligations for private ones. Above
we have investigated the tradeoﬀs that arise in the application of these various
means for ensuring that pledges will be honored.
Our analysis assumes that settlement can always be assured by the posting
of suﬃcient collateral. As posting collateral entails costs, a key issue in payment
system design is the extent to which the use of collateral may be avoided. Net-
ting of settlement obligations can economize on collateral but is not a panacea,
since the eﬃcacy of netting depends on the extent to which incentives are in
place for agents to engage in oﬀsetting trades.
Another means of economizing on collateral is for potentially risky agents
to be monitored by more reliable agents. In a decentralized context this can be
accomplished if the payment system operates in a hierarchical fashion, whereby
some agents are excluded from directly settling their own obligations, but must
instead settle through a monitor. Incentive constraints on the monitors imply
that monitored agents either end up either paying fees to their monitor, or post-
ing collateral, for the privilege of being able to settle their obligations through
the payment system.
We also investigate the extent to which settlement in public-sector obliga-
tions, i.e., settlement on the books of a central bank, may enhance the reliability
of settlement without the use of costly collateral. Central-bank operated settle-
ment systems oﬀer two noteworthy advantages over private systems. The ﬁrst of
these is that the absolute ﬁnality of payment in central bank funds allows agents
to engage in DVP or “pure spot” transactions. The second is that settlement
in central bank funds is robust, in the sense that agents will always have an
incentive to engage in DVP transactions, even in states where the reliability of
all private credits may be suspect.
These advantages must be weighed against the associated cost, i.e., increased
exposure of the central bank and ultimately the taxpayers to credit risk. This
25cost may be partly oﬀset by the netting implicit in central bank settlement,
or by the judicious application of collateral requirements. Too stringent collat-
eral requirements, however, particularly during times of duress, can undo the
potential beneﬁt provided by central bank settlement.
In conclusion, the analysis above has provided an outline of some of the
issues involved in the design of large-value payment systems, and of some of
the key diﬀerences between public and private systems. Ongoing technological
change and ﬁnancial deregulation suggest that payment systems will continue
to confront these issues in one form or another. Additional investigation of the
topics addressed above may prove useful in delineating the tradeoﬀs posed by
these developments.
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